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Abstract. In this paper we aim to explore how the type of bank ownership - local 
private banks, government-owned banks (public banks) and foreign banks - can 
affect relationship lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by using a 
unique data set from Bangladeshi banking sector. We found that private banks 
differ from government-owned and foreign banks in terms of relationship 
lending and credit facilities to SMEs. More specifically, our results suggest that 
unlike government and foreign banks, private banks do consider soft information 
from relationship lending while setting up the loan spread to SMEs. We can also 
confirm that exclusive banking relationship or repeated banking with private 
banks can soften credit conditions (loan maturity and covenants). Moreover, we 
found empirical evidence that banking relationship is important for private banks 
in terms of SME credit risk evaluation. Finally, as according to our expectation, 
the results confirm that regardless of prior relationship, private banks are more 
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depended on collateral-based lending to SMEs than government-owned or 
foreign banks. 
Keywords: bank financing, small and medium enterprises, bank ownership, 
relationship lending, Bangladesh. 
JEL Classification: G21, L26, O16 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Contribution of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to the development of any economy is 
undeniable and, as a result, policy makers and researchers are actively involved in resolution of the issues 
faced by SMEs while ensuring their survival (Virglerova et al., 2016; Adamowicz, & Machla, 2016; 
Dubravska et al., 2015; Spoz, 2014). Analysis of 76 developed and developing countries by Ayyagari et al. 
(2007) showed that SMEs are solely responsible for the creation of about 60 percent of employment in 
manufacturing sector. Moreover, SMEs also help improve socioeconomic conditions of a country by 
reducing import and producing products locally by fulfilling the needs of local community (Straka et al., 
2015; Setyawan et al., 2015). Regardless of their significant contribution to the economy, the survival rate 
of SMEs is significantly lower than of large corporate firms due to various reasons, including restricted 
access to bank finance, high interest rates, lack of skilled labour forces, existence of technological and 
financial risks, severe competition from large firms etc. (Stafanovic et al., 2009; Norek & Arenhardt, 2015; 
Kljucnikov et al., 2016).  
It is widely contended that information opacity of SMEs is more severe than of larger firms, hence 
they need special banking assistance via relationship banking (Berger et al., 2001b). During the relationship 
with a bank customer banking information is gathered from the SME owner by a loan officer through 
repeated communication, also known as “soft information”. This soft information is not easily transferable 
due to its nature and, as a result, it needs more judgmental analysis by the loan authority (Berger & Udell, 
2002). From the theoretical point of view, relationship banking can minimize information gap and facilitate 
SME’s access to bank finance, because it is generally difficult to access proper audited financial data while 
lending to SMEs. Recent bank financing literature states that SMEs’ access to bank financing can be affected 
by the ownership structure of banks, due to the fact that different banks have different organizational types 
and lending techniques. Therefore, soft information processing may not be suitable for all banks. Stein 
(2002) argues that banks with a simple and flat organizational structure can be in a better position to lend 
to SMEs as it is easier for them to transmit soft information which is necessary in small business lending. 
Similarly, flatter organizational structure of a bank gives more authority to bank officer which may allow 
them use more discretion in the loan decision-making process. More hierarchical structure of banks makes 
the process much more complicated, which may hamper the loan-decision process of banks. Research 
suggests that small and domestic private banks are more suitable for building a long-term relationship, they 
can process soft information more efficiently than other types of banks due to more simple organizational 
structure (Mian, 2006). Taking into consideration Stein (2002) arguments, it can be legitimate to argue that 
foreign banks are not in a superior position in SMEs’ lending due to difficulties in access to local 
information. On the other hand, the research on government-owned banks suggests that they are more 
politically driven, and they act as the agents of political leaders in achieving their own goals (Sapienza, 2004). 
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As a result, it is possible that government-owned banks may focus their support mainly on political party 
supporters, while other real business units may be left as credit rationed. 
In this paper we examine the influence of banks’ ownership types on SMEs financing, with the focus 
on possible differences in the relationship of private, government-owned and foreign banks to SMEs’ 
lending. We also examine how the information from relationship lending can affect banks’ decision in setting 
the interest rate, collateral, loan terms and credit risk management. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first research focused on the effect of bank ownership type to relationship lending and its outcome to SMEs 
in the context of Bangladesh. Our results indicate that significant differences between private, foreign and 
government-owned banks exist in terms of relationship lending and SME financing. The paper makes a 
significant contribution to understanding the importance of banking relationship for SMEs and how it may 
affect their financing possibilities in relation to different types of banks. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Banks ownership and relationship lending 
Relationship lending, the most common techniques for lending to small firms, is based on the "soft" 
information which is accessible by keeping a close relationship with the client. Alternatively, there exist 
transaction-based lending techniques, those are mainly based on the "hard" information about the 
businesses. For example, financial statements based lending, asset based lending and credit scoring (Petersen 
& Rajan, 2002). Researches dealing with the soft information generation and bank lending efficiency argue 
that the soft information collection and careful examination of the information can increase the lending 
efficiency of the bank that can positively affect the small business access to credit (D’Aurizio et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, empirical results show that commercial banks can improve the credit rating model by 
including the relationship lending qualitative (soft) information of the borrower in the rating process, and 
that focus only on the hard financial information can be misleading (Dolezal et al., 2015) 
However, literature review shows that banking relationship and soft information generation can be 
affected by various factors including the type of bank ownership. It is found that information from the 
lending relationship are usually local in nature and, as a result, it is possible for the local banks to gather this 
proprietary information much better than for the distant banks (Jimenez et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
local domestic banks are better aware of the business condition in the community and hence they can 
evaluate the business prospects of the firm better than the foreign banks. Unfortunately for foreign banks, 
they have minimal local information and, as a consequence, have to rely mostly only on hard financial data 
for evaluating of SME loan application (Berger et al., 2001b). 
La Porta et al. (2002) show that government-owned banks are dominating in the world economy. They 
found that in 1995 state-owned banks were holding about 42% of the asset in the banking industry around 
the globe. There exist several competing theories of government ownership of banks and its effect on bank 
lending. Literature shows that government-owned banks are established to fix the market failures and to 
drive the economy by which the government can implement its economic goals (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). 
On the other hand, Stiglitz (1993) argues that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are there to improve the 
socio-economic conditions and by which they can improve the social welfare of the community. However, 
political view on state-owned enterprises suggests that politicians intentionally drive and implement policies 
through the SOEs to increase the benefit of their supporter (La Porta et al., 2002). Additionally, lack of 
incentives for the management in the state-owned banks demotivates them to spend more time and effort 
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in a relationship lending (Berger et al., 2008). In contrast, private banks maintain better customer 
relationships, because of handsome incentives for bank managers, and also for the loan officers and 
therefore, they can process the soft information more efficiently (Beck et al., 2011). Therefore, depending 
on the bank ownership type, bank lending policies and techniques can differ and which is inherent in their 
organizational structure.  
2.2. Empirical evidence 
Researches of the influence of different types of bank’s ownership on developing and emerging 
markets are quite limited. Results from the Indian market show that foreign banks are efficient in hard 
information based lending and as a result they prefer to lend to transparent firms that have audited financial 
statements (Gormley, 2006). Whereas, state-owned banks in India maintain a relationship based lending 
only to firms, to which they are instructed to assist by the government (Berger et al., 2008). In a cross-
country analysis (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru) Clarke et al. (2005) showed that large foreign banks 
lend to the small firms more than the large local private banks in Colombia and Chile. On the other hand, 
in Argentina and Chile, SME financing is showing a faster growth when foreign banks have significantly 
large share on the local market. Therefore, they argue that when a large foreign bank significantly deploys 
its resources on the local market it can penetrate it more than the host nation banks. Mian (2003) studied 
the bank lending behaviour in 100 emerging markets by surveying 1600 banks and stated that private banks 
are superior in the soft information based lending and hence, they can extend credits to SMEs more than 
foreign and government-owned banks.  
In contrast, Nguyen & Wolfee (2016) showed that government-owned banks in Vietnam provide more 
loans to SMEs than private banks, because government-owned banks have strong branch network, which 
helps them to build the relationship lending environment. They also find that bank-borrower exclusive 
relationship can increase the loan size and loan maturity. However, empirical results also show that it is 
possible to get loans with lower interest rates from the public banks as a result of political and hidden 
motives for lending to firms (Berger et al., 2008). Detragiache et al. (2006) in context of Malaysian market 
confirmed that foreign banks are lending only to well-established firms that have minimal default 
probabilities and hence foreign banks are using matching principle. That means that foreign banks only skim 
the cream and lend only to credit-worthy firms. Thus we can infer that large and transparent firms are more 
likely to benefit from the government-owned and foreign banks. Fiserova et al. (2015) in a cross country 
analysis showed that performance of the foreign banks in the host nation is not only affected by the bank 
own characteristics but also due to the economic condition of the host nation such as inflation rate and 
GDP growth.  
In the context of Bangladesh, it is found that foreign banks ask for lower collateral and having collateral 
on a loan contract can increase access to finance (Rahman et al., 2016a, 2016b). Mian (2003) found that 
government-owned banks have less screening and monitoring processes for loans, and consequently, they 
require higher collateral. Likewise, government-owned banks have more predefined interest rates on the 
loans, which are higher than the rates of the private or foreign banks. Beck et al. (2011) found that foreign 
and large domestic public banks tend to provide loans with higher collateral and devote less attention to the 
soft relationship based information. Beck et al. (2011) concluded that large domestic and foreign banks use 
more arms-length lending, and so they ask for more collateral from the SMEs due to minimum access to 
the soft information. Nevertheless, private banks are superior in the soft information based lending and it 
may allow them to ask for more collateral from the SMEs to increase their superiority on the loan contract, 
as by nature relationship banking is risky. Moreover, some authors also suggest that small banks ask for 
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more collateral from the SMEs than the large banks in emerging markets due to their capital shortages and 
also loan loss reduction incentives (Menkhoff et al., 2012). Taking this information into consideration we 
can also argue that the majority of the private banks in Bangladesh is small in comparison to the 
government-owned or foreign banks and, as a result, private banks can ask for more collateral from the 
SMEs than the government or foreign banks. 
2.3. Hypotheses  
In accordance with the aim of the paper we set four scientific hypotheses related with the type of bank 
ownership and its effect on various measures on relationship lending, including interest rate, collateral, loan 
terms and credit risk management of the SME loan. 
H1. Private banks emphasize the relationship banking in setting up the interest rate more than the 
government-owned and foreign banks. 
H2. Private banks can ask for higher collateral from the SMEs than the government-owned and foreign 
banks. 
H3. An exclusive banking relationship with the private bank can relax the credit terms for SMEs (i.e. 
loan maturity and covenants). 
H4. Private banks consider the relationship banking information for SME credit risk management 
more than the government-owned and foreign banks. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses the data collected by a self-administered questionnaire survey during June, July and 
August 2015. Respondents were given five points Likert scale questions to disclose their opinion about 
relationship lending, on the scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree' (1 point) to ‘Strongly agree' (5 points) over 
the neutral point (3 points). Moreover, in line with the existing literature, we have recognized a relationship 
as a long-term one, when the length of the relationship between a bank and the borrower lasts for at least 
five years (Chang et al., 2014). 
The survey was targeted on the bank credit officers who deal with SME finance. Our survey was 
purposively narrowed only of the SME credit officers, with the aim to tease out the most essential 
information that they consider while dealing with a loan proposal. The initial target of the survey was to 
collect data at least from one credit officer from all regular commercial banks that are operating in 
Bangladesh, including public (government-owned), private and foreign banks.1 We were able to collected 
data from 110 credit officers from 44 commercial banks, mainly from their different branches operating in 
Dhaka city - the capital of Bangladesh. Our data set is quite unique due to the fact that most of the survey 
was performed within the relationship lending area, where the data from SME owners or firm level are 
collected. Our data are directly from the SME credit officers, who can be considered as the main authority 
in a relationship banking that processes and transmits data to the upper authority for decision making. As a 
result, credit officers’ opinion can be more valuable in a relationship lending than the SME owners may 
think. 
                                                     
 
1 Currently there are 56 commercial banks operating in Bangladesh, where 8 banks are controlled and owned by the government, 
39 private commercial banks and 9 foreign banks. 
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The study uses descriptive statistics as a mean of gaining understanding about the banks characteristics. 
In addition, this study applied the test of Chi-square in order to examine the validity of hypotheses. For the 
purpose of the empirical analysis we decided to analyse private banks in comparison with the merged group 
of public and foreign banks, due to our persuasion of their similar characteristics as a result of their large 
organizational structure and hierarchical decision-making process. We have to state that data from both 
public and foreign banks are limited, as our data set covers only 10 responses from 5 foreign banks and 25 
responses from 4 major public banks. 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our full data set of 44 banks as well as segmented analysis 
according to the bank ownership types (public, private and foreign). While considering the full data sample 
we can see that the mean Bank Age is 22 years, so represented banks are neither too old, nor very young. It 
is noticeable that on an average SME Advance to Total Advance Ratio is about 15 per cent. It means that 
commercial banks loan exposure in the SME segment in Bangladesh is not so high. At the same time, it is 
noticeable that about 73% of total advance is secured by fixed asset collateral in the form of land, machinery 
and vehicles. On the other hand, personal guaranty (29%) and third-party guaranty (11%) are also important 
mechanisms for secured lending to SMEs by commercial banks. 
If we consider the segmented analysis across the bank ownership type, we see that state-owned banks 
are much bigger in terms of Total Assets and also older than the private and foreign banks. It suggests that 
government set up the state-owned banks to boost the economic development of the country in order to 
start a new economy right after gaining the independence of Bangladesh. With regards to SME Advance to 
Total Advance Ratio, private banks are outperforming public banks by 10% and foreign banks by 9%. This 
indicates that private banks are recognizing the diversification of their portfolio to SMEs and similarly it can 
be possible that corporate lending market is getting more saturated. On contrary, the difference between 
public and foreign banks in terms of SME Advance to Total Advance Ratio is insignificant, which can be 
explained by the fact that public and foreign banks favour the corporate clients rather than the SME clients, 
because of the fact that corporate clients usually present higher level of information transparency due to 
obligatory audited financial statements as well as better market reputation. The result also suggest that both 
public and foreign banks are more concerned about collateral-based lending, as about 81% of the loans in 
the public banks and about 83% of the loans in the foreign banks segment are collateralized by fixed assets. 
Consequently, the financial data of the banks suggest that private banks are less concerned about mortgaged 
based lending while government and foreign banks are more comfortable in secured lending.  
Total bank assets and all other secondary data used for our analyses are collected from the annual 
reports and audited financial statements of the banks that were published in 2014. Banks financial statements 
for the year 2015 have not yet been published. 
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Table 1 
All banks N = 44; Public bank N= 4; Private bank N= 35; Foreign bank N= 5. 
 
Standard deviations are in parenthesizes. 
Source: Bank’s annual statements 2014; Authors’ calculations 
*1 USD= 77.87 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) as of 31 December 2014. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 2 
Test of Hypotheses 
 
Source: Authors’ results. * indicates significance level at 0.10 level, ** indicates significance level at 0.05 level, *** 
indicates significance level at 0.01 level. 
 
Bank Ownership Type 
All Banks Public bank Private bank 
Foreign 
bank 
Variable/Bank characteristics Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Bank Age (years) 22(12) 43(.50) 19(11) 23(14) 
No. Of Total Branches 180(270) 944(290) 114(75) 17(10) 
No. Of Total Employees 3175(4181) 13489(7191) 2324(1681) 703(810) 
Total Assets (BDT Million)* 182460(168508) 581748(278514) 149298(78973) 88523(84559) 
Total Deposits (BDT Million)* 144612(138860) 475033(235255) 118043(62719) 60947(59916) 
Total Advances (BDT Million)* 103310(75434) 252402(98562) 94711(51952) 42507(45200) 
SME Advances (BDT Million)* 15717(15864) 21401(15646) 16736(16171) 4236(5503) 
SME Advance To Total Advance 
Ratio 
15(10) 7(4) 17(11) 8(5) 
Personal Guarantee (BDT 
Million)* 
14991(19170) 11842(4715) 14251(17760) 27575(35218) 
Third party Guarantee (BDT 
Million)* 
6483(7373) 14118(8164) 5569(6782) 6286(6151) 
Fixed Assets collateral to Total 
Advance Ratio 
73 81 72 83 
Personal Guarantee to Total 
Advance Ratio 
29 4.6 3 19 
Third party Guarantee to Total 
Advance Ratio 
11 5.2 13 2 
    Bank Ownership Type 
    
Chi-Square 
Value 
P-Value 
H1: Relationship banking and lending interest rate 8.203 0.084* 
H2: Borrowers without collateral are more likely to be credit rationed 8.175 0.085* 
H3: Exclusive bank-borrower relationship facilitates loan terms 
(duration and covenants) 10.171 0.038** 
H4: Relationship lending helps to minimize credit risk 17.791 0.001*** 
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Table 2 presents the results of the quantitative evaluation of our scientific hypotheses that was made 
in order to understand how relationship banking and the lending information are evaluated by private, public 
and foreign banks to process SME loans application. Furthermore, whether the soft information from 
lending relationship helps the bank to set the loan conditions and also to evaluate the credit risk of the loan. 
At first, we see that how private and other (public and foreign) banks treat the relationship banking soft 
information for setting the loan spread for SME borrowers. Our result is significant at 10% significance 
level. We found the evidence that private banks pay more attention to the relationship information for 
setting up the loan spread than public and foreign banks. Our result is consistent with the result of Beck et 
al. (2011), who stated that private banks are better able to manage a long-term customer relationship and 
hence can provide loans with lower interest rate. Therefore, we can accept our first hypothesis H1 and 
propose that private banks in Bangladesh do consider prior lending information while setting up the interest 
rates more intensively than government-owned or foreign banks do. According to the result we also propose 
that a long-term relationship with the private bank may help the SMEs to get access to bank loans with 
lower interest rates. Therefore, relationship banking is helpful for firms that are unable to provide audited 
financial statements, or firms those have problems to present their better credit quality. Our result can be 
influenced by the simple organizational structure of the private banks, or more incentives for the private 
bank loan officer to produce soft information for an efficient lending decision. In contrast, the large 
organizational structure of the public and foreign banks may allow them to focus more on the corporate 
clients rather than the SME clients. Similarly, it can also be the cause of heavy dependency of foreign and 
public banks on the hard financial information for processing SME credit (Berger et al., 2008). Our results 
are also consistent with the prior research and that foreign banks are less efficient in using the soft 
information (Clarke et al., 2005). Hence, we can say that soft information is more local in nature and it is 
not suitable for foreign banks to access the soft information due to the higher cost of collecting the soft 
information. At the same time, large organizational structure of public banks may impose barriers to using 
the soft information to evaluate the appropriate interest rate for a borrower.  
We also hypothesized that whether SMEs are credit rationed from the private banks due to lower 
availability of collateral, their smaller size and focus more on risky relationship lending. We have found 
evidence that it is possible to be credit rationed from the private banks without collateral and our result is 
significant at 10% significant level. Hypothesis H2 is confirmed. This result signifies that private banks do 
consider the soft information for extending credit to SMEs. However, borrowers are more likely to be credit 
rationed from the private banks as a result of lack of collateral. Empirical research show that large foreign 
banks use more arms-length lending, which reduces collateral requirements for SMEs (Jimenez et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, Menkhoff et al. (2012) confirmed that banks use collateral to secure their capital from 
the bad loans and hence, as private banks are smaller in size, as a result, they are more concerned about the 
reduction of any loan losses which may occur from loan defaults. On top of that, use of the soft information 
may not always correctly generate accurate credit risk level of the borrower because of the soft information 
interpretation errors and hence, banks use collateral to minimize moral hazard in SME lending (D’Aurizio 
et al., 2015). Berger et al. (2001a) find that use of small business credit scoring reduces credit rationing to a 
great extent in the context of USA. Thus, foreign and public banks’ usage of credit scoring technology may 
facilitate the lending for SMEs more than from the private banks. We can summarise our results stating that 
private banks more intensively emphasize on collateral as a result of their size and capital constraints, since 
private banks neither benefit from the government guarantees like public banks, nor any support from the 
parent organization like the foreign banks.  
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We researched whether the exclusive banking relationship with the private banks in comparison to 
public and foreign banks generates any benefit for the SMEs in terms of relaxed loan terms, for example, 
loan maturity and covenants. We have found that exclusive relationship in a form of usage of more products 
and services does provide benefits for the SMEs with the loan terms from the private banks. The result is 
valid at 5% significance level. Hence, we confirm that exclusive banking relationship is valued by private 
banks while dealing with the loan application and we consequently accept hypothesis H3. On the other 
hand, the results may be interpreted in a way that private banks do consider their loyal customer loan 
application with more sincerity and try to provide their best services. Nevertheless, as public and foreign 
banks have similar lending techniques (arms-length lending) as a result it may not generate any banking 
benefits for the SMEs. Public banks may provide extra benefits only to their politically involved customers 
and foreign banks can provide additional benefits to their corporate clients due to extensive investment to 
the corporate portfolio. However, Stein (2002) showed that exclusive banking adversely affects the loan 
terms for the SMEs as a result of rent seeking behaviour of the banks. Moreover, exclusive banking can 
increase the firm’s switching costs and hence banks can charge higher interest rate and require higher 
collateral (Stein, 2002). The above-mentioned research did not examine the exclusive banking relationships 
with appropriate duration and covenants. Our research provide more evidence about the exclusive banking 
relationship and its effect on SME lending.  
Finally, we examined whether bank ownership matters in case of evaluation of the soft information for 
credit risk management of the firms. Specially, whether private banks use the soft information more than 
public and foreign banks for determining the credit risk of the loan. We supposed that private banks will 
give more emphasize on the soft information for SME credit risk than other type banks. According to our 
result, we can confirm that private banks do evaluate soft information more closely than public and foreign 
banks for evaluating the credit risk of the loan. Hence, we can say that soft information generated from the 
banking relationship helps private commercial banks to evaluate the probability of defaults on the extended 
loan. Our result can be justified not exactly from bank ownership perspective as we do not have any prior 
research on the issue. Nevertheless, we can qualify our results from the soft information based lending 
perspective (Uchida et al., 2012). Results from the large banks standpoint suggest that they are not willing 
to use soft information for credit risk evaluation due to agency cost associated within the organization 
(Berger and Udell, 2002). Additionally, large banking structure of public and foreign banks make it difficult 
to use the soft information for credit risk evaluation. Consequently, we can infer that the soft information 
from banking relationship is helpful for the private banks in classifying the credit risk of the firm beyond 
the hard financial information based lending. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we aimed to explore how the type of bank ownership - local private banks, government-
owned banks (public banks) and foreign banks - can affect the relationship lending efficiency of banks, 
since, different banks have different organizational structure and lending techniques. We hypothesized that 
private banks will be more efficient in relationship banking than government-owned and foreign banks as a 
result of their expertise in soft information processing. As a consequence, private banks will consider the 
soft private information while setting up interest rates, loan maturity, collateral and credit risk of the SME 
borrower. We have used a new data set from Bangladesh which was collected from 44 commercial banks. 
Empirical results of the paper show that private banks do value the soft information while setting up 
the interest spread in a loan contract for SMEs more than government-owned or foreign banks. Thus, we 
found confirmation that proprietary soft information provides additional benefits to the banks beyond the 
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hard financial data. We tested the hypothesis whether the exclusive relationship between the bank and the 
borrower helps the firm to get loans with longer maturity with relaxed covenants. According to our 
expectation, we found that exclusive relationship with the private banks through repeated use of products 
and services helps the SME borrowers to receive loans with longer maturity and with relaxed covenants. 
Thus, we can infer that exclusive banking relationship can be helpful for borrowers from the private banks 
but not from the government or foreign banks to get loans with longer maturity and less strict loan terms. 
Furthermore, we confirm that relationship banking information is significantly considered by the private 
banks while rating the credit risk of the borrower. Therefore, the result shows the significance of the soft 
information in evaluating the credit risk for SMEs. Moreover, we also find empirical support that private 
banks emphasize more on collateral-based lending in comparison to public or foreign banks. Our result 
suggests that it is possible that potential borrowers are more likely to be credit rejected from the private 
banks when collateral is not pledged due to their small asset base. Private banks are smaller and they need 
to protect their loan portfolio from bad loans through secured lending. We conclude that private banks may 
have a comparative advantage in relationship lending over the government-owned or foreign banks. Since, 
private banks have a flatter organizational structure which gives them an advantage of information 
processing. Additionally, it is also possible that better structure of the incentives of the private bank 
managers or loan officers is motivating them to be more effective in relationship banking. On the other 
hand, government and foreign banks can be more efficient in arms-length lending as a result of their 
complex hierarchical organizational structure.  
Despite of the significant contributions regarding the influence of bank ownership structure on the 
relationship lending, this paper has few drawbacks. At first, we did not differentiate between government-
owned and foreign banks due to data limitation. It is possible that these two types of the banks have different 
lending criteria and lending techniques. Moreover, our data set did not cover all the commercial banks those 
are active in SME lending in Bangladesh and we may leave out significant attributes from the left-out banks. 
Moreover, our results are based on the opinion of the credit officers and it may not reflect the actual 
situation in the banking industry. Finally, our data set is generated only from Dhaka - the capital city of 
Bangladesh. Therefore, we cannot generalize our result on other regions of Bangladesh where financial 
market is not so well developed. Therefore, we leave them for our future research scope. 
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